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After the disclosure of data from companies, research on executive compensation 
began to develop. Several studies on executive compensation in banking found 
that the determination of compensation is positively related to company 
performance. This research aims to determine the relationship between company 
performance and executive compensation of Islamic Commercial Bank’s  in 
Indonesia. Company performance is proxied by Return on Assets (ROA). This 
study uses a sample of Islamic Commercial Banks because they have very good 
performance growth and currently only have a market share of 6.18% compared 
to the national financial market so they still have the potential to experience 
growth.  Furthermore, sample used 14 Islamic commercial banks registered with 
the OJK during 2014-2019. The research method used panel data regression 
analysis. The results showed that the performance of Islamic Commercial Bank’s 
has an effect on executive compensation. Islamic Commercial Bank Executives 
have an obligation to improve company performance (ROA) because it affects the 
compensation received by the executive. 
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There is very little research on executive compensation in Asia due to 
limited company data (Kato et al., 2007). Companies in Asia generally keep data 
about the compensation given to their employees secret. In 2006, Bank Indonesia 
issued regulation Number 8 of 2006 concerning the implementation of Good 
Corporate Governance (GCG) which supports the principle of transparency. This 
regulation requires banking institutions to disclose remuneration data and all 
facilities received by directors and commissioners in the Good Corprate 
Governance report (Bank Indonesia, 2006) 
After the disclosure of data from companies, research on executive 
compensation began to develop. Several studies on executive compensation in 
banking found that the determination of compensation is positively related to 
company performance (Mardiyati et al., 2013;Sari & Harto, 2014). This research 
supports early research on executive compensation and firm performance (Buigut 
et al., 2014; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Murphy, 1999). Company performance is 
an indicator of the success that the company has achieved. To assess company 
performance, financial and non-financial performance can be used (Gimbert et al., 
2010). The growth in the company's financial performance indicates that the 
company is experiencing growth and can increase owner's profits. 
Sharia banking in Indonesia itself has shown positive developments, 
especially after obtaining legal certainty from the government with the issuance of 
Law 21 of 2008 concerning Islamic banking. Based on OJK's Islamic banking 
statistics, as of December 2019 there are currently 14 Islamic Commercial Banks, 
20 Sharia Business Units and 167 Sharia Rural Banks. Islamic banking assets 
always increase every year. In 2018 Islamic banking has total assets of Rp. 489.69 
trillion or grew 12.57% from 2017, then in 2019 experienced a growth of 9.93% 
or Rp.538.32 trillion. Islamic banking in Indonesia has always experienced an 
increase in profitability every year. In 2018 Islamic banking was able to make a 
profit of Rp. 3.1 trillion or growing 107% from 2017 even though in 2019 it only 
increased by 47% or Rp. 3.3 trillion (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2020). 
Increasing the performance of banks in Indonesia has prompted shareholders 
to reward them with high and increasing compensation. The compensation 
received by bank executives in Indonesia is an average of Rp. 12 billion a year is 
the highest compensation in ASEAN. Compared to Malaysia only Rp. 5.6 billion 
or the Philippines for Rp. 1.1 billion or one twelfth of the bank executives in 
Indonesia. Compensation received by bank directors and commissioners during 
2007-2010 increased by 65% or an average of 21% per year. (“Infobank: Analisis 
Strategi & Keuangan,” 2012). 
Compensation is a return on contributions made by employees to the 
company (Milkovich et al., 2013). The components in executive compensation 
can be short-term remuneration, long-term remuneration and other benefits 
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(Goergen & Renneboog, 2011). Based on OJK regulation number 59 of 2017, 
sharia banking executives in Indonesia get fixed and variable rewards in cash or in 
cash in accordance with their duties, powers and responsibilities. Compensation is 
formulated by the remuneration and nomination committee then determined by 
the shareholders through the General Meeting of Shareholders (Otoritas Jasa 
Keuangan, 2017) 
Executive compensation can be used by company owners to solve agency 
problems. Agency problems are a possible conflict of interest between 
shareholders and company management (Gill et al., 2008). Agency problems arise 
because management does not act in the interests of shareholders but prioritizes its 
own interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The provision of high compensation 
encourages agent performance to be better and this also makes the company's 
performance better (Ruparelia & Njuguna, 2016). 
This study uses a sample of Islamic Commercial Banks because they have 
very good performance growth and currently only have a market share of 6.18% 
compared to the national financial market so they still have the potential to 
experience growth. This study aims to analyze the relationship between company 
performance as proxied by the ratio of Return on Assets (ROA), whether it has an 
influence on the compensation given to executives or not in accordance with 
previous research. This research data uses compensation data provided by the 
company to the Board of Commissioners and Directors which is available in the 
annual reports of 14 Islamic Commercial Banks registered with the OJK during 
the period 2014-2019. 
 




An agency relationship is an agreement between one or several people (the 
principal) and the agent to carry out work on behalf of the principal and authorizes 
the agent to make decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The relationship between 
the principal and the agent can lead to a condition of information imbalance 
because the agent has more information about the company than the principal, 
which can cause agency problems. 
Agency problems are a potential conflict of interest between shareholders 
and company management (Gill et al., 2008). Agency problems arise because 
agents running a company do not act in the interests of shareholders but prioritize 
their own interests. Agents have more information and with their authority can 
withhold some information that will benefit the agent in order to get higher 
compensation for contributions made to the company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
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Executive Compensation 
One form that may reduce agency problems is by providing compensation 
for executives. Compensation is one way to reconcile the differences in interests 
between shareholders and management (Pepper, 2018). Compensation is a return 
on contributions made by employees to the company (Milkovich et al., 2013). 
Based on research, giving high compensation encourages agent performance to be 
better and this also makes company performance better (Ruparelia & Njuguna, 
2016). The components in executive compensation can be short-term 
remuneration, long-term remuneration and other benefits (Goergen & Renneboog, 
2011).  
 







Effect of Company Performance on Executive Compensation 
 
The issue of executive compensation will always be related to agency 
theory. This theory assumes that executives act in their own interests, so there 
must be a mechanism for executives to pay attention to the interests of 
shareholders. Effective monitoring will result in the ability to manage the 
company so that it can improve the company's performance, thus the company 
value will increase, and the principal's welfare will also increase. 
One form that may reduce agency problems is by providing compensation 
for executives. Compensation is one way to reconcile the differences in interests 
between shareholders and management (Pepper, 2018). Company performance is 
one of the bases that can be used to measure the performance of a company in a 
certain period after being measured by several measurements. 
Several findings (Gill et al., 2008; Rau, 2015) state that ROA, NPM, and 
EPS as measures of company performance always have a positive impact on 
executive compensation. In order to maximize company profit, measurement 
using ROA can explain significantly its effect on the payment of the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) in the company (Boschen & Smith, 1995). Likewise, 
research conducted by (Ramaswamy et al., 2000) and (Ghosh, 2006) where this 
year's ROA is stated as a significant factor in determining the total CEO 
compensation. The hypotheses in this study are: 
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This study uses a sample from Islamic banking. A total of 14 Islamic 
Commercial Banks were registered with the OJK during 2014-2019. The analysis 
in this study used a balanced panel data regression analysis (balance panel data). 
Compensation data is obtained from the annual report published by each Islamic 
banking, while the performance data for Islamic banking, which is proxied by 
ROA, is obtained from the OJK. The method in this research is using Pooled 
Least Square (PLS) panel data regression. Data is processed using eviews 10 
(Widarjono, 2018). The equation model tested in this study is as follows: 
       =                
Information : 
 
COMP  : Executive Cash Compensation 
ROA : Return On Asset 
i   : type of banking 
t   : time 
 
Table 2.  
Variables Description, Hypothesis and Source of Data 
Variables Description Hyphotesis Source 
Dependent Variables 
   




   
Firm Perfomance Return On Asset (ROA) + OJK 
Source: Data processed (2020) 
 
In Table 2, executive cash compensation (COMP) consists of salaries, 
bonuses and allowances. Company performance is measured by measuring 
profitability, namely Return on Assets (ROA). The ROA ratio can be calculated 
by dividing net income with total assets (Alexander, 2018). In addition, in this 
study a regression of several other equations was also carried out, in which each 





Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for all variables. The standard deviation 
of the compensation received by company executives in the study period has a 
value far above the average for the observed company. This indicates that the 
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compensation received by company executives has fluctuated and varied greatly. 
Compensation with a maximum value during the study period is Rp. 136,715 
million and the minimum value is Rp. 4.4 million with an average value during 









(Million rupiah) ROA 
Mean 22.490 0,97 
Median 15.519 0,80 
Maximum 136.715 13,60 
Minimum 4.400 -20,13 
Std. Dev. 21.410.160 7,61 
Source: Data processed by researchers 
Table 3 shows the average value of return on assets (ROA) of 0.97%. The 




To determine the appropriate model in this study, Common Effect or Fixed 
Effect, a Chow Test was conducted. If the Chi-square probability is more than 
0.05 then the correct model is the Common Effect, and if it is less than 0.05 then it 





Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Pool: POOL02    
Test cross-section fixed effects  
          
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
          
Cross-section F 186.999246 (12,1078) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 1228.998840 12 0.0000 
     
     
Source: Data processed (2020) 
Based on Table 4, the Chi-Square probability value is 0.0000 which 
indicates that it must be retested with the Hausman Test. 
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To determine which model is appropriate, Fixed Effect or Random Effect, a 
Hausman Test is performed. If the Chi-Square probability is less than 0.05 then Ho is 
rejected. Here is the hypothesis: 
 
Ho: Random Effect 
H1: Fixed Effect 
 




Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Pool: POOL03    
Test cross-section random effects  
          
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
          
Cross-section random 12.483638 1 0.0004 
          
Source: Data processed (2020) 
Based on the results from Table 5, the Chi-Square probability value is 
0.0004 which indicates that Ho is rejected. Thus, this study uses the Fixed Effect 
model to investigate the effect of company performance on executive 
compensation. 
 
Tabel 6  
Fixed Effect Regression Results 







Adjusted R-squared 0,75 
Observation 84 
 Note ***,**,* are stationer at α=1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
Source: Data processed (2020) 
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The empirical results of the whole equation can be seen in table 5 which is 
the result of panel data regression analysis using the Fixed Effect Model. ROA in 
Equation I has a positive coefficient and the probability of the t-test is significant 
at the 1% level. ROA also shows positive and significant at the 1% level. This 
shows that ROA has a positive and significant effect on executive compensation. 
The executives of the company is obliged to improve the level of company 
profitability (ROA) because this will provide an assessment of the performance of 
a company. Therefore, executive compensation is based on the rate of return on 
assets (Sari & Harto, 2014). This result is also supported by (Khasanah, 2015) 
which establishes that ROA has a positive and significant effect on the 
compensation received by executives. 
By looking at the general correlation of the overall equation, the results 
show that the company's performance as measured by ROA has a significant 
positive effect on executive compensation. These results cannot be generalized to 
all financial companies in Indonesia because there is still a lot of data on 
compensation that is not available. Future research is expected to add other factors 
that appear to affect executive compensation, such as company performance using 
firm value and price changes or stock returns. Other variables that can also be 
added include company specific characteristics which can be seen from the 
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